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I. INTRODUCTION 
A long-standing central tenet of U.S. Patent Office doctrine is 
"compact prosecution."l When a patent application is examined 
substantively,2 the Patent Office examiner is instructed that the 
* Professor of Law, University of Baltimore School of Law. B.S., cum laude, 
Princeton University. J.D., Harvard Law SchooL The author would like to 
thank his research assistant, Erienne Sutherell. 
1 See U.S. Dep't of Commerce, New Examining Procedures, 781 OF}'. GAZ. 
PAT. OFFICE 1, 1 (Aug. 7, 1962) (providing the first official recorded reference to 
the implementation of Compact Prosecution); see also Implementation of the 
Patent Cooperation Treaty, 43 Fed. Reg. 20465 (May 11, 1978); Rules of 
Practice in Patent Cases; Reexamination Proceedings, 46 Fed. Reg. 29182 (l\'I:ay 
29, 1981); Revision of Patent and Trademark Fees ConfIrmation, 47 Fed. Reg. 
41276 (Sept. 17, 1982); Changes to Patent Practice and Procedure, 62 Fed. Reg. 
53150 (Oct. 10, 1997); Changes to Implement the Cooperative Research and 
Technology Enhancement Act of 2004,70 Fed. Reg. 1818-02 (Jan. 11,2005). 
2 A patent application undergoes preliminary examination almost 
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review is to be "complete as to all matters,"3 and that "piecemeal 
examination should be avoided."4 
In theory, it is hard to fault this concept of compact 
prosecution. Avoiding multiple actions on multiple grounds is 
efficient for both the patent office and applicants, and should 
lead to earlier disposition. The system made good sense when 
adopted. However, there have been significant changes to the 
patent landscape in the ensuing years. 
In the current environment, the theoretical efficiency and 
speed offered by compact prosecution face challenges resulting 
from the dramatic increase in the number of patent applications 
being filed,5 the factual reality of long delays before a patent 
application reaches the stage of first substantive evaluation (the 
point at which compact prosecution takes place),6 the increased 
importance of early application filing dictated by the transition to 
a first·to-file system,7 and developments in the Supreme Court's 
evolving definition of patentable subject matter.S Combined, 
immediately, to assure that the application is complete (e.g., that there are no 
missing pages), contains the necessary identifying information and is 
accompanied by the required fees. See generally 37 C.F.R. § 1.53 (2014) (stating 
the initial filing requirements for a patent application). Substantive 
examination - evaluation of whether the application claims an invention that is 
statutory subject matter which is novel, non-obvious and enabled; typically does 
not take place until a year and a half (or more) later. 
3 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(b). 
4 MPEP § 707.07(g) (9th ed., Mar. 2014). 
5 See U.S. Patent Statistics Chart Calendar Years 1963 - 2018, U.S. PAT. & 
TRADEMARK OFF., http;//www_uspto.gov/go/taflus_stat.htm (last updated July 
24,2014) (indicating a steady increase in U.S. patent applications). 
6 See Anthony C. Tridico, Ph.D. et al., USP'l'O Backlog Impacts Biopharma 
Industry, GENETIC ENG'G & BIOTJ<;CHNOLOGY NEWS, Sept. 1, 2008, available at 
http://www.martindale_com/matter/asr-977198.pdf ("[TJhe U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (USPTO) is currently overwhelmed by a backlog of hundreds 
of thousands of patent applications, which delays pat.ent examination and 
is suance."). 
7 See John Villasenor, March 16, 2013; The United States Transitions To A 
'First-Inventor-To File' Patent System, FORBES (Mar. 11, 2013, 11:54 PM), 
http://www.forbes.com/sites/john villa senor/20 13103/111march -16-20 13-america-
transitions-to-a -first-inventor-to-file-patent-systeml (explaining that the U. S. 
first-to-file system requires inventors to take "prompt action to protect his or 
her invention" or risk losing the patents rights to a later inventor). 
8 See John V. Biernacki et aI., Alice Corp. v. CLS Bank: Did the Supreme 
Court Sign the Warrant for the "Death of Hundreds of Thousands of Patents'7, 
JONES DAY (June 2014), http://www.jonesday.comJAlice-Corp-v-CLS-Bank-Did-
the-Su preme-Court-Sign -the-W arrant- for- the· Dea th -of-Hundreds-of-Thousands 
2015] RETHINKING COMPACT PROSECUTION 259 
these factors increase both the uncertainty of whether a claimed 
invention is even patent-eligible and the time it takes for that 
uncertainty to be reduced, thereby presenting a difficult and 
unfair problem for innovators.9 Innovators must choose between 
maintaining trade secrets in their innovations or seeking patent 
protection, and must generally do so within eighteen months of 
filing a patent application.lO Increasing the uncertainty of 
availability of patent protection and delaying the time when that 
uncertainty is reduced beyond the critical eighteen month period 
makes patent protection a less attractive option. Innovators may 
therefore be motivated to choose trade secrecy in preference to an 
increasingly uncertain prospect of patent protection, an outcome 
that is contrary to the constitutional goal of promoting progress. 
A reevaluation of the central principle of compact prosecution 
in light of current law and conditions suggests modifying the 
system to allow patent applicants to opt out. 
II. THE THEORY OF COMPACT PROSECUTION 
In considering whether to issue a patent, the U.S. Patent and 
Trademark Office (PTO) examines the application to determine 
whether it discloses and claims an invention that meets the 
statutory criteria: ll principally, that the claimed invention is 
patentable subject matter,12 that it is novel,13 that it is non-
obvious,14 and that it is adequately described in the application. 15 
If a claim fails any of the statutory criteria, it should be 
rejected. Therefore, viewed solely from the perspective of 
minimizing short-term workload, an examiner could reject the 
·of·Patents·06·20·2014/?RSS=true (discussing the important U.S. Supreme 
Court's decisions regarding patentable subject matter). 
9 See Max Stul Oppenheimer, The innovator's Dilemma, 4 AM. u. Bus. L. 
REV. (forthcoming 2015) (providing a more detailed discussion of the problem 
facing innovators). 
10 See 35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A) (2012) ("[E]ach application for a patent shall 
be published ... promptly after the expiration of a period of 18 months from the 
earliest filing date."). 
11 [d. § 131. 
12 id. § 101. 
13 Id. § 102. 
14 Id. § 103. 
15 Id. § 112(a). The statute requires that the application contain a written 
description in sufficient detail to enable one of ordinary skill in the art to make 
and use the invention. Id. The statute further requires that the application 
contain drawings, if necessary to understand the invention.id. § 113. 
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claim immediately upon finding any ground for rejection. 16 
However, viewed from the perspective of the applicant, this type 
of piecemeal examination has several disadvantages. It 
complicates the process and results in higher costs in terms of 
time and legal fees, and it also delays the ultimate disposition of 
the application by setting up sequential arguments over various 
grounds of rejection. 17 
Current PTO policy calls for "compact prosecution:"18 
identification of all issues related to patentability in the first 
substantive response to the applicant. l9 The Manual of Patent 
Examining Procedure (MPEP) cautions against "piecemeal 
prosecution:"20 
Piecemeal examination should be avoided as much as possible. The 
examiner ordinarily should reject each claim on all valid grounds 
available .... Rejections on grounds such as lack of proper 
disclosure, lack of enablement, indefiniteness and res judicata 
should be applied where appropriate even though there may be a 
seemingly sufficient rejection on the basis of prior art.21 
The logic of compact prosecution is simple and compelling: once 
an application is taken up by an examiner, the examination 
should be complete. This avoids forcing an examiner to "relearn" 
an application multiple times,22 and it gives the applicant as 
16 The applicant has the opportunity to argue for a reversal of the examiner's 
position and, if successful, would compel the examiner to look for other 
instances of non-compliance and thereby negate some of the efficiency. See 37 
C_F_R. § 1.111 (2014) (permitting an applicant to reply to, and request 
reconsideration of, the examiner's position). 
17 See id. § 1.112 (allowing an applicant to request subsequent reexamination 
of his or her claim before any rejection becomes final); see also MPEP § 710 (9th 
ed., Mar. 2014) (discussing the relevant statutory period for requesting 
reexamination of a patent application). 
18 MPEP § 706.03. 
19 37 C.F.R. § 1.104(b) ("The examiner's action will be complete as to all 
matters, except that in appropriate circumstances, such as misjoinder of 
invention, fundamental defects in the application, and the like, the action of the 
examiner may be limited to such matters before further action is made."). 
20 The PTO distinguishes between "compact prosecution" and "piecemeal 
prosecution." The term "piecemeal" is pejorative_ As this article argues that 
compact prosecution is flawed and should be replaced, it will use the term 
"staged prosecution" in place of "piecemeal prosecution." As discussed later, the 
PTO already deviates from compact prosecution in certain cases and views 
these deviations as efficient and desirable. See discussion infra Part V.A. 
21 MPEP § 707.07(g). 
22 Applicants are generally allowed at least six months to reply to an 
examiner's action regarding an application. See 35 U.S.C. § 133 (Supp. 2013) 
2015) RETHINKING COMPACT PROSECUTION 261 
complete a picture as possible of the hurdles, if any, to 
patentability. There is, however, a tradeoff. Because compact 
prosecution requires more work than piecemeal examination, it 
delays the time from filing until an application is taken up for 
examination. Given the current system of pre-grant publication,23 
the pressures of a first-to-file system,24 and the uncertainty as to 
the scope of statutory subject matter,25 this delay is problematic. 
Compact prosecution is too good an idea to abandon. However, 
changes can be made to ameliorate its disadvantages. 
III. THE FuNDAMENTAL BARGAIN 
All inventions start as trade secrets. The Uniform Trade 
Secrets Act defines a trade secret as: 
[T]nformation ... that: (i) derives independent economic value, 
actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who 
can obtain economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the 
("Upon failure of the applicant to prosecute the application within six months 
after any action therein ... or within such shorter time. .. as fixed by the 
Director in such action, the application shall be regarded as abandoned."). The 
PTO usually sets an administrative deadline of less than six months, but its 
administrative rules provide that such deadlines can be extended up to the 
statutory six months by paying late fees. See 37 C.F.R. § 1.136(1) (2014) ("If an 
applicant is required to reply within a nonstatutory or shortened statutory time 
period, applicant may extend the time period for reply up to the earlier of the 
expiration of any maximum period set by statute or five months after the time 
period set for reply, if a petition for an extension of time and the fee set in 
§ 1.17(a) are filed."); MPEP § 710.02(e) (stating the same). An examiner will 
typically review a hundred other applications (depending on the art unit) in 
that time. 
23 Prior to 1999, patent applications were maintained in secrecy until issued 
as patents. See Joseph M. Barich, Pre-Issuance Publication of Pending Patent 
Applications: Not So Secret Anymore, U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'y 415, 416 (2001). 
Under that system, the problem of pendency did not arise. [d. In 1999, the 
Patent Statute was amended by the American Inventors Protection Act to 
provide for publication of most patent applications eighteen months after their 
initial filing date, whether the application had been allowed as a patent or not. 
See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. lO6-113, § lOOO(a) (9), 
113 Stat. 1501 (1999) (enacting into law S. 1948, 306th Congo § 4503(b)(1) 
(1999». In general, patent applications are treated as confidential by the PTO 
until the eighteen-month publication date (or until the application is issued as a 
patent if the applicant certifies that international applications will not be filed). 
35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1)(A)-(B). 
24 See discussion infra Part IV.B. 
25 See discussion infra Part IV.C. 
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subject of efforts that are reasonable under the circumstances to 
maintain its secrecy.26 
Thus, until the inventor discloses the invention to someone 
else, it meets the definition of a trade secret. A trade secret lasts 
as long as the definitional requirements are met;27 it has the 
theoretical potential to be a perpetual right. Publication of a 
patent destroys any trade secrets contained in the application by 
making them generally known. 28 The inventor therefore must 
make a choice: keep the trade secret (perhaps forever) or give it 
up in exchange for a patent. 29 
The owner of a trade secret can prevent misappropriation, 
which is generally defined as disclosure or use of a trade secret 
which has been obtained from the owner by improper means,:~o 
while the owner of a patent can prevent infringement, which is 
generally defined as the manufacture, use, sale or importation of 
a product incorporating a patented invention for a period starting 
on the date the patent is issued and ending twenty years after 
the date the patent application was filed.31 Patent infringement 
gives rise to damages, which are to be no less than a "reasonable 
royalty,"32 and the possibility of an injunction33 and attorney fees 
2G UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(4) (amended 1985). 
27 See David S. Almeling et al., A Statistical Analysis of Trade Secret 
Litigation in Federal Courts, 45 GONZ;. L. REV. 291, 304 (2010) ("[AJs long as the 
definitional requirements are met, virtually any subject matter of information 
can be a trade secret." (internal quotation marks omitted». 
28 Max Stul Oppenheimer, Harmonization Through Condemnation: 1s New 
London the Key to World Patent Harmony?, 40 VAND. J. TRANSNA'r'L L. 445, 447 
nA (2007). Allowing publication would also destroy the trade secret as a failure 
to make reasonable eU'orts to maintain its secrecy. ld. 
29 More precisely, the exchange is for a possibility of a patent. See discussion 
infra Part IV. It is this difference (possibility instead of certainty) that makes 
the pendency problem important and justifies the argument in favor of staged 
prosecution. 
30 UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2)(i). 
31 35 U.s.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. 2013). The patent expires twenty years after 
the date the earliest application was filed (i.e., if there are a series of related 
patent applications, referred to as "continuing applications," the term is 
measured from the date the first in the series was filed), and is subject to 
adjustment in certain circumstances related to delays in processing by the PTO. 
Id. 
32 35 U.s.C. § 284 (2012). Although the statute specifies that damages be "no 
less than a reasonable royalty," in practice damages rarely exceed what is 
determined to be a reasonable royalty. See Third Wave Tech., Inc. v. Stratagene 
Corp., 405 F. Supp. 2d 991, 1101 (W.D. Wis. 2005) (sating that under § 284, 
courts "imagine a negotiation between the patentee and infringer taking place 
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in certain cases.34 
While enforcement of a trade secret turns on whether the 
alleged infringer obtained the information from the trade secret 
owner, enforcement of a patent does not.:~5 Thus, subsequent 
independent discovery is a defense against trade secrets but not 
against patents. B6 In addition, once a second party has 
independently discovered the trade secret information, that party 
is free to disclose it and thereby destroy the original trade secret 
owner's rights;37 a patent is not invalidated by subsequent 
independent discovery.38 The patent system therefore provides 
at the moment the infringement began" which "is an approach that experts 
have employed for decades in patenL cases"). 
3:~ The language of the statute regarding injunctions is permissive, not 
mandatory: "Courts may grant injunctions in accordance with the principles of 
equity to prevent the violation of any right secured by patent, on such terms as 
the court deems reasonable." 35 U.S.C. § 283. However, since a patent is, by 
definition, unique, it might seem by analogy to real property law that 
injunctions should always issue because damages would never provide a 
complete remedy for iniringement. See id. § 102(a) (stating that a patented 
invention must be novel). The Supreme Court has held, however, that even in 
patent cases, a court must apply the traditional equitable four·factor test in 
deciding whether it is appropriate to issue an injunction. See eBay, Inc., v. 
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006) (discussing the four-factor tel:>t 
a plaintiff must satisfy before a court may grant a permanent injunction). 
34 35 U.s.C. § 285. 
35 See Thomas W. Foley, Keeping A Company's Confidences Secret: Trade 
Secret Enforcement Under iowa's Uniform Trade Secrets Act, 59 DRAKF: L. REV. 
1, 12-13 (2010) (explaining that unlike patent law, the owner of a trade secret 
cannot "prevent others from using public information to replicate his product"). 
~6 See Dan L. Burk & Mark A. Lemley, Policy Levers in Patent Law, 89 VA. L. 
REV. 1575, 1585 n.24 (2003) (explaining that patent law tends to offer "more 
protection than trade secret law because a patent forbids even independent 
discover by a competitor"); Rebecca S. Eisenberg, Proprietary Rights and the 
Norms of Science in Biotechnology Research, 97 YALE L.J. 177, 206 (1987) 
("[I]ndependent discovery is not a defense to a patent infringement suit, 
although it is a defense to a claim for misappropriation of trade secrets."). 
37 See Ari 13. Good, Trade Secrets and the New Realities of the Internet Age, 2 
MARQ. INTELL. PROP. L. REV. 51, 63 (1998) ("[TJrade secret law does not prohibit 
one from utilizing information which is discovered independently of the 
[owner]."); see also Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1002 (1984) 
(stating that the public disclosure of a trade secret destroys the information's 
status and thus deprives the trade secret's owner of a property interest). 
a8 Under the fIrst-to-file system, a second inventor can destroy the first 
inventor's right to a patent by disclosing the invention before the first inventor 
discloses the invention (and files an application within a year from the 
disclosure) or files a patent application. 35 U.S.C. § 102(a). The first inventor 
can minimize or eliminate this risk by filing promptly. 
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motivation for holders of patent-eligible trade secrets to disclose 
them (and therefore surrender protection under trade secret law) 
in exchange for rights that are broader in scope but potentially 
shorter in duration. A patent has a fixed, but guaranteed, 
expiration date,39 while the term of a trade secret is uncertain 
and depends on events beyond the owner's controJ.4° 
A patent represents a bargain between the federal government 
and an innovator, envisioned by the Constitution. 41 The 
Constitution authorizes Congress to motivate scientific progress 
by granting limited term monopolies to inventors.42 Congress 
implemented this power early.43 This system promotes progress 
by motivating innovators to give up trade secret protection in 
exchange for a limited term, federal government protected, 
monopoly on the innovation. 44 The patent laws are not "primarily 
designed to provide a special private benefit .... [They are] 
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and 
inventors ... and to allow the public access to the products of 
their genius after the limited period of exclusive control has 
expired."45 However, in order to motivate that creative activity, 
39 See 35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (Supp. 2013) (stating that a patent's fixed 
expiration date 1S suhject to the owner's payment of periodic maintenance fees). 
40 See Vincent Chiappetta, Myth, Chameleon or Intellectual Property 
Olympian? A Normative Framework Supporting Trade Secret Law, 8 GEO. 
MASON L. REV. 69, 78 (1999) ("Trade secret protection theoretically can last 
forever .... However, the holder constantly faces the uncertainty of sudden loss 
of rights ... which can occur at any time through ... third party actions."); see 
also UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985) (defining the term 
"misappropriation" to include "improper means" taken by a third party in 
acquiring or disclosing a trade secret). 
41 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. For a detailed analysis of how the clause was 
adopted, see Edward C. Walterscheid, To Promote the Progress of Science and 
Useful Arts: The Background and Origin of the Intellectual Property Clause of 
the United States Constitution, 2 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 1, :31-34 (1994). 
42 U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cL 8. 
43 The first patent statute was enacted in Congress' second session in 1790. 
Patent Act of 1790, ch. 7, 1 Stat. 109 (repealed 1793). 
44 Note that this particular exchange is Congress' invention - the 
Constitution does not require disclosure of the invention in order to obtain the 
exclusive rights conferred by a patent. The Constitution simply provides that 
"The Congress shall have Power ... To promote the Progress of Science and 
useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the 
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art. 
I, § 8, cl. 8. 
45 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984). 
While Sony involved alleged infringement of copyrights, both copyright and 
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the statute offers inventors several benefits;46 in return, the 
public gets disclosure. 47 
In theory, the disclosure required by the patent system 
benefits society more broadly than trade secret protection 
because broad disclosure provides the starting point for further 
research to a larger pool of researchers. 4H 
IV. THE PENDENCY PROBLEM 
The fundamental bargain-limited term monopoly in exchange 
for disclosure of a trade secret-comports with standard contract 
notions. 49 The owner of a trade secret is free to exchange that 
patent laws are authorized by the same clause of the Constitution and the Sony 
copyright analysis relies in part on patent precedents. See id. at 440-42 
(discussing the "charge of contributory infringement" under patent law as it 
applies to copyright law cases). 
46 See, e.g., :35 U.S.C. § 154(d) (Supp. 2013) ("[A} patent shall include the 
right to obtain a reasonable royalty from any person who ... makes, uses, offers 
for sale, or sells in the United States the invention claimed in the published 
patent application."). 
47 Malla Pollack notes that there are multiple possible interpretations of 
"progress" in Art. I, § 8, cl 8: "quality improvement in the knowledge base, 
quantity improvement in the knowledge base (numerically), quantity 
improvement in the knowledge base (judged economically), and spread 
(distribution to the population)" but concludes that "[o]f these, quantity is the 
least supportable. Quality has low support and creates problems in context. 
Spread has the highest support." Malla Pollack, What is Congres8 Supposed to 
Promote?: Defining "Progre8s" in Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of the United 
States Constitution, or Introducing the Progress Clause, 80 NEB. L. REV. 754, 
756--57 (2001). 
4S See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 481 (1974) ("When a 
patent is granted and the information contained in it is circulated to the general 
public and those especially skilled in the trade, such additions to the general 
store of knowledge ... will stimulate ideas and the eventual development of 
further significant advances in the art."); Peter Lee. Note, Patents, Paradigm 
Shifts, and Progress in Biomedical Science, 114 YALE L.J. 659, 665 (2004) 
(arguing that patent law promotes "hypothesis generation" and "advance[s] 
fundamental scientific theory"); Lawrence D. Graham & Richard O. Zerbe, Jr., 
Economically Efficient Treatment of Computer Software: Reverse Enginerring, 
Protection, and Disclosure, 22 RU1'. COMPUTER & TECH. L.J. 61, 73 (1996) 
("Theoretically, [public] disclosure of new ideas leads to further innovation. The 
belief is that even though the public is prevented from interfering with 
inventors' exclusive rights, tbe ability to study their inventions will lead to 
more invention."). 
49 See Fried. Krupp Aktien·Gesellschaft v. Midvale Steel Co., 191 F. 588, 594 
(:3d Cir. 1911), cert. denied. 223 U.S. 728 (1912) ("[AJn American patent is a 
written contract between an inventor and the government ... [that] c'Onsists of 
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property for other property. 50 The fundamental bargain is 
complicated, though, when the owner of the trade secret must 
decide whether to surrender the trade secret in exchange for a 
patent before the availability of the patent is assured.51 
For this reason, pendency becomes important. There are two 
pendency periods of interest: "first action pendency" (the time 
from the filing of a complete patent application until a patent 
examiner substantively reviews the application and issues a first 
action regarding patentability) and "disposition pendency" (the 
time from filing until the application is disposed of, either by 
allowance and issue as a patent or by abandonment).52 While the 
PTO measures both,5~ and both are of interest to an applicant, 54 
first action pendency is the applicant's first insight into how the 
PTO views the application and therefore the applicant's first 
opportunity to make an informed evaluation of the chances of 
obtaining a patent. 55 
mutual, interrelated considerations moving from each party to the other for the 
such contract."). 
50 Ct. ROGER A. MCCLAIN, REFRAMTNG ECONOMICS: ECONOMIC ACTION AS 
IMPJ<;RF«;CT COOPERATION 23 (Edward Elgar Publ'g 2014) ("[1] is possible for trade 
secrets to be legitimately bought and sold .... "). Interesting contract issues, 
beyond the s(.'Ope of this article, arise where t.he trade secret owner is a minor. 
See, e.g., In re Apple In·App Purchase Litig., 855 F. Supp. 2d 1030, 1036 n.4 
(N.D. Cal. 2012) ("A minor's lack of capacity to contract affects only the ability 
of the other party to enforce the contract against the minor, not the minor's 
ability to enforce the contract against the other party."). 
51 See Kewanee Oil, 416 U.S. at 487 (explaining that "[t]he risk of eventual 
patent invalidity" may cause some trade secret owners "not to take the trouble 
to seck to ohtain ... patent protection. , . regardless of the existence of trade 
secret protection"). 
52 See J. Michael Martinez de Andino & Gregory M. Murphy, US Patent 
Office Delays Creating Limited and Late Protection, 19 No. 11 INTELL. PROP. & 
TECH. L.J. 17, 17 (2007) (estimating that first action pendency takes roughly 
22.6 months, while the entire period of disposition pendency is typically 31.1 
months). 
53 U.S. PA'T'ENT & TRADEMARK OFFICE, PERFORMANCE & ACCOUNTABILITY 
REPORT FISCAL YEAR 2013, at 14 (2014) [hereinafter USPTO REPORT FY 2013], 
available at http://www.uspto.gov/about/stratplanlar/USPI'OFY2013P AR. pdf. 
54 See Request for Comments on Optimum First Action and Total Patent 
Pendency, 79 Fed. Reg. 38,854 (July 9, 2014) (seeking input from the IP 
community regarding "optimal patent first action and total pendency target 
levels"). 
55 The inventor still faces uncertainty, as the first substantive action is 
rarely the end of prosecution. The first action does, however, provide important 
information indicating how the PTO views the application. In particular, under 
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This evaluation is important because of the trade secret for 
patent disclosure trade. Under pre-1999 law, the problem did not 
arise. Patent applications were maintained in confidence until 
the patent issued. 56 Under that system, at any point prior to 
issuance of the patent, the applicant could withdraw the 
application and its contents would remain secret. 57 Thus, there 
was a bargain in the contract sense. The applicant traded a trade 
secret for a patent and both parties knew exactly what they were 
giving up and what they were getting. 58 In 1999, as part of an 
international harmonization effort, 59 the statute was amended to 
provide for publication of pending patent applications. nO Under 
the new regime, the fundamental contract bargain could still be 
maintained, if the PTO disposed of applications before 
publication. 61 However, if the application has not even been 
the current system, this is the earliest date on which the inventor will learn 
whether the PTO perceives an issue regarding statutory subject matter. Of 
course, there is still uncertainty even if the PTO sees no such issue, as the issue 
can still be raised as a defense in an infringement action. 
56 See Joseph M. Barich, Pre-Issuance Publication of Pending Patent 
Applications: Not So Secret Any More, 2001 U. ILL. J.L. TECH. & POL'y 415, 416 
(2001) (explaining that before 1999, "a patent application was kept in secrecy by 
the PTO until the patent application issued as a patent"). 
57 See id. ("[I[f the inventor was not satisfied by the scope of the c1aims 
offered by the PTO, the inventor was under no obligation to proceed with 
prosecution of the patent application and the inventor suffered no loss of' 
rights."). 
58 Even an issued patent can be invalidated, and the Commissioner can 
withdraw a patent (although that power is rarely exercised). 37 C.F.R. § 1.1313 
(2014). Either of' these situations deprives the applicant of nothing if the 
invalidation is based on prior art, but poses a problem if the invalidation is 
based on qualification as statutory subject matter. See discussion infra Part 
V.B. 
.59 See generally John F. Duffy, Harmony and Diversity in Global Patent Law, 
17 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 685, 715-16 (2002) (providing a brief history regarding 
the early publication of patent applications globally). 
nO See Consolidated Appropriations Act, 2000, Pub. L. No. 106-113, Div. 
B, § 1000(a)(9), 113 Stat. 1501, 1536 (1999) (enacting the Intellectual Property 
and Communications Omnibus Reform Act of 1999, S. 1948, 106th 
Congo § 4502(a» (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. § 122 (Supp. 2013». 
Generally, applications are published eighteen months after their priority date. 
35 U.S.C. § 122(b)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
61 Disposition - i.e., either allowance of claims or final denial of the 
application - would be ideal. A first substantive patent office evaluation of the 
application prior to publication would at least give the applicant an indication 
of the likelihood of obtaining patent protection before the irrevocable decision to 
surrender trade secret protection had to be made. 
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reviewed substantively at the time the applicant must make the 
decision, the decision is more a lottery than a traditional 
contractual bargain. 
A. The Basic Bottleneck 
The PTO faces a significantly different world today than it did 
in 1999. In 1999, roughly 270,000 utility patent applications were 
filed and just over 150,000 were issued as patents.. 62 In 2013 (the 
latest year for which there is available data), nearly 575,000 
applications were filed and more than 275,000 patents were 
issued.63 Expectations are that the transition to first-to-file under 
the America Invents Act ("AlA") will result in even more 
applications being filed, as nervous inventors are motivated to 
file multiple applications on the same invention in order to 
reduce the risk that an anticipatory prior art reference will be 
created while the inventor is perfecting the invention. 64 
While the PTO has made progress in the last five years, it has 
been unable to provide a first substantive review of most patent 
applications within eighteen months of their filing date, and the 
average time to reach a final decision on patentability 
approaches two and a half years.Go Assuming that two weeks 
would be sufficient time for an inventor to receive a first 
substantive action, evaluate it, make a decision whether to 
continue with the application or abandon it, the average 
pendency to first action would need to be reduced to 16.5 months 
in order to allow time for a decision to abandon the application to 
be communicated to the PTO in time to withdraw the application 
G2 There were 270,187 applications filed and 153,485 issued. U.S. Patent 
Statistics Chart: Calendar Years 1963 - 2013, U.S. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF., 
http://www.uspto.gov/go/taf/us_stat.htm (last updated July 24, 2014). Of course, 
the issued patents were unlikely to have been filed in the same year t.hey were 
issued because of the time taken to examine an application. The numbers, 
however, are representative. Between 1994 and 2004, applications ranged from 
189,857 to 356,943 and issued patents ranged from 101,676 to 164,290 . ld. 
63Id. 
64 See Sean T. Carnathan, Patent Priority Disputes-A Proposed Re-
Definition of "First-to-Invent," 49 ALA. L. REV. 755, 796 (1998) (explaining that 
"the burden on the PTO will increase" under a first-to-file system due to "hasty 
applications" with "limited experimental exemplification or support"). 
65 Average pendency to first action was 18.2 months and LO disposition 29.1 
months in 2013. USPTO REPORT FY 2013, supra note 53, at 14. In 2008, the 
average time to first action was 25.6 months and the average time to disposition 
was 32.2 months. Id. at 16. 
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from publication.66 
B. The First-lo-File Factor 
The move from the historical first-to-invent system to a first-
to-file system was debated for more than forty years before 
adoption. fi7 During that debate, defenders of the historical system 
worried about the impact of the change on the quality and 
pendency of patent applications.68 Under the historical first-to-
invent system, the first inventor was entitled to a patent if an 
application was filed within a year of the first public disclosure or 
offer of sale of the invention.69 Under a first-to-file system, if the 
technology claimed in a patent application is already in the prior 
art7° as of the date the application is filed, the application will be 
rejccted.71 Critics of the first-to-file system were therefore 
concerned that such a system would force inventors to file 
multiple premature and sketchy disclosures for fear of losing out 
to a later inventor who managed to draft an application more 
66 An applicant can avoid publicatiun by filing an express abandonment of an 
applicatiun. 37 C.F.R. § L138(c) (2014). However, "the Office cannot discontinue 
the pre-grant publication process during the last two to four weeks of the 
publication process." MPEP § 1120 (9th ed., Mar. 2014). It would therefore 
appear that the PTO must receive notice of abandonment no later than (and 
possibly earlier than) seventeen months from the effective application date. 
67 The debate at the national level can be traced back at least to a 1966 
recommendation by President Johnson's Commission on the Patent System. 
COMM. ON THE JUDICIARY, U.S. SENATE, To PROMOTE THE PROGRESS OF USEFUL 
ARTS: REPORT OF THE PRESlDENT'S COMMISSION ON THE PATENT SYSTEM, S. Doc. 
NO.5, at 14----15 (1st Sess. 1967), available at http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu 
Icgi/viewcontent.cgi?article= 10 1 O&context=historical. The move was also 
supported in 1992 by the Clinton Administration. ADVISORY COMM. ON PATENT 
LAw REJ<'ORM, A REPORT TO THE SECRETARY OF COMM"ERCE 11 (1992), available at 
http://ipmall.info/hosted]esources/lipa/patents/patentact/ ACPLR-l. pdf; see also 
Oppenheimer, supra note 28 at 462-70 (cataloguing the arguments for and 
against the two systems). 
68 Oppenheimer, supra note 28, at 468. 
69 85 U.S.C. § 102(b) (2012). 
70 "Prior art" refers to information which is relevant to a determination of 
patentability: information which was available to the public through a printed 
publication, through public use, through an offer of sale, "or otherwise available 
to the public," Id § 102(a)(I), expanded by the legal fiction that issued patents 
and published patent applications are treated as though they were published on 
their filing date, not the date on which the public gained access to them. 
Id. § 102(a)(2). 
71 Id. § 102(a). The prior art is also the basis for rejecting claims as "obvious." 
Id. § 103. 
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quickly.72 This, critics worried, would lead to an increased burden 
on the PTa, which would need to respond either by lowering 
examination quality or tolerating increased application 
pendency.73 Former Patent Commissioner Banner noted that the 
negative impact of the system would fall disproportionately on 
inventors with limited resources. 74 
On March 15, 2013, the debate ended and the first-to-file 
system went into full effect. 75 While it is too soon for definitive 
data, one commentator pointed to Japan as a first-to-file country 
whose experience was predictive: over five times as many 
applications are filed in Japan than in the United States and 
many of the Japanese applications are "scraps of papers written 
by the inventors and submitted for a priority date."76 
U.S. standards would penalize such cursory applications 
because the statute sets a higher standard of disclosure: one 
sufficient to enable those of ordinary skill in the field to make 
and use the invention. 77 If the United States continues to 
maintain its standards of enablement, U.S. inventors face a 
disadvantage since they are required to file their applications in 
the U.S. 78 and the higher standards translate into longer time to 
72 See, e.g., MAURICE H. KLITZMAN, PATENT INTERFERENCE: LAW AND PRACTICE 
24 (1984) (noting that first· to-file would encourage a race to the patent office 
with "hasty application drafting with limited experimental exemplification or 
support"); Carnathan, supra note 64 at 796 (explaining that applicants may be 
"forced to file continuation-in-part applications in increased numbers" under a 
first-to-file system); Gregory J. Wrenn, What Should Be our Priority: Protection 
for the Nrst to .File or the First to Invent?, 72 ,J. PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC'y 
872, 885 (1990) (cautioning that "there are significant risks that result from 
over-encouraging early filing"). 
73 See, e.g., Vito J. DeBari, Note, International Harmonization of Patent Law: 
a Proposed Solution to the United States' First-to-/ile Debate, 16 FORDHAM INT'L 
L. J. 687, 704 (1993) (suggesting that a first· to-file system would "resultD in a 
decline in the quality of applications" and "an increased volume of patent 
applications filed for defensive purposes"). 
74 See Donald W. Banner, Patent Law Harmonization, 1 U. BALT. INTELL. 
PROP. L.J. 9, 12 (1992) (stating that a first-to·file system "would aid the 
multinational corporations but mortally injure the individual inventor and 
small companies"). 
75 Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-29, § 3, 125 Stat. 284, 
285-93 (2011) (codified as amended in scattered sections of 35 U .S.C.). 
76 Charles R. B. Macedo, Note, First-to-File: Is American Adoption of the 
International Standard in Patent Law Worth the Price?, 1988 COLUM. Bus. L. 
REV. 543,573 n.155 (1988). 
77 35 U.S.C. § 112(a) (2012). 
78 U.S. inventors are required to file III the United States and wait six 
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prepare the application (and therefore a later priority date). 
Therefore, a prudent U.S. inventor, unable to take advantage of 
more relaxed filing requirements abroad, would need to file at 
least two applications per invention: a minimum application to 
protect against lower-standard foreign filings, and a fully-
enabled application meeting U.S. standards. Thus, even if 
inventive activity does not increase, it would be expected that 
filings would. These additional filings would increase the burden 
on the PTO and would be expected to increase pendency times. 
C. The Definitional Dilemma 
Adding even greater complexity, the Supreme Court's evolving 
definition of patentable subject matter has made it harder to 
predict patentability.79 Patents are only granted for certain types 
of inventions, known as "statutory subject matter" and defined in 
35 U.S.C. § 101 as machines, manufactures, compositions of 
matter and processes. so The list of patentable subject matter, 
though broad,81 is exclusive. 82 
More than 150 years ago, the Supreme Court held that 
Congress has "plenary" power to decide how to implement the 
months before filing abroad, or to obtain a foreign filing license. Id. § 184(a). 
79 There is always uncertainty in predicting patentability of an invention. 
Under 35 U.S.C. §§ 102 and 103, a patent will be denied if the claimed 
invention was already known or is merely an obvious extension of what was 
already known. Because it is impossible to fully characterize the prior art (some 
of which may be contained in patent applications which have been pending less 
than eighteen months and are therefore inaccessible), there is always an 
element of uncertainty around a patentahility opinion. This is an unavoidable 
aspect of the priority system, and one that is not even fully removed upon grant 
of the patent. Even an issued patent is subject to invalidation based on prior art 
that was not before the PTO during examination. However, the issue of 
patentable subject matter is a different (and solvable) uncertainty. See 
discussion infra Part V.C. 
80 35 U.S.C. § 101. 
81 The term manufacture is meant to include "anything under the sun that is 
made by man." S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5 (1952); H.R. REP. No. 82·1923, at 6 
(1952); see also Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (rejecting the 
argument that a genetically engineered hacterium was implicitly excluded from 
statutory subject matter because, although a "composition of matter," it was 
alive). 
82 See Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron Corp., 416 U.S. 470, 483 (1974) ("[N]o 
patent is available for a discovery, however useful, novel, and nonohvious, 
unless it falls within one of the express categories of patentable subject matter 
of35 U.S.C. § 101."). 
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Constitutional power to promote progress through the patent 
system83 and more recently the Court warned lower courts not to 
read words into the patent statute.B4 This has not stopped the 
Court itself from creating exceptions to the categories of 
statutory subject matter that are established by the clear words 
of the statute. 85 
While the statutory language chosen by Congress is broad and 
has remained largely unchanged since first enacted in 1790, the 
Supreme Court has engrafted limitations on what otherwise 
appears to be a clear statement of Congressional intent. 
Moreover, the Court has revised its interpretation several times, 
leaving researchers uncertain as to what can be protected (and 
therefore what research might be justified economically).86 
The statute authorizes four categories of statutory subject 
matter,87 but the Supreme Court excludes from patent protection 
"la ws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas"S8 
because "[p)henomena of nature ... , mental processes, and 
abstract intellectual concepts are ... the basic tools of scientific 
and technological work."89 This matters, not only because the 
Court's definition is narrower than the statute's, but more 
importantly because the Court's definition is less predictable 
than the statute's. The unpredictability of the Supreme Court's 
definition is clearly shown by the difficulty the Federal Circuit 
has had in applying it-in every statutory subject matter case 
8B See McClurg v. Kingsland, 42 U.S. 202, 206 (1843) ("lTJhe powers of 
Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by the terms of the 
Constitution, and ... there are no restraints on its exercise."); Evans v. Jordan, 
13 U.S. (9 Cranch) 199, 204 (1815); Bloomer v. McQuewan, 55 U.S. (14 How.) 
539, 541~42 (1852); Bloomer v. Millinger, 68 U.s. (1 WalL) 340, 351 (1864); 
Eunson v. Dodge, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 414,417 (1873). 
!;4 Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 182 (1981). 
85 Id. at 219; Parker v. Flook, 437 U.S. 584, 596 (1978); Gottschalk v. Benson, 
409 U.S. 63, 71 (1972). 
86 Max Stu! Oppenheimer, Patents 101: Patentable Subject Matter and 
Separation of Powers, 15 VAND. J. EN'!'. & TECH. L. 1, 3 (2012). 
87 Diehr, 450 U.S. at 182. 
88 Id. at 185 ("[LJaws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract ideas" are 
unpatentable); Benson, 409 U.S. at 67 ("Phenomena of nature, though just 
discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual concepts are not 
patentable as they are the basic tools of scientific and technological work."); 
Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculant Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130 (1948) ("[PJart of 
the storehouse of knowledge ... are manifestations of laws of nature, free to all 
men and reserved exclusively to none."). 
89 Benson, 409 U.S. at 67. 
2015] RETHINKING COMPACT PROSECUTION 273 
reaching the Supreme Court, it has reversed the Federal 
Circuit.90 In dealing with these reversals, the Federal Circuit has 
noted the difficulty of fathoming the Supreme Court's 
instructions. Its frustration is evident in passages such as: 
The Supreme Court has not been clear ... as to whether such 
subject matter is excluded from the scope of § 101 because it 
represents laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract ideas. 
The Supreme Court also has not been clear as to exactly what kind 
of mathematical subject matter may not be patented. The Supreme 
Court has used, among others, the terms "mathematical 
algorithm," "mathematical formula," and "mathematical equation" 
to describe types of mathematical subject matter not entitled to 
patent protection standing alone. The Supreme Court has not set 
forth, however, any consistent or clear explanation of what it 
intended by such terms or how these terms are related, if at alL 91 
Given this uncertainty at the nation's specialized patent court, 
it is understandable that patent applicants would face difficulty 
in evaluating this aspect of patentability of their inventions-and 
therefore in evaluating the wisdom of surrendering trade secret 
protection. This uncertainty as to property rights is a 
disincentive for inventors to spend the time on fundamental 
research and for investors to provide the necessary funding. 92 
The clearest explanation of the theoretical underpinnings of 
these judicial exclusions may be found in Justice Breyer's dissent 
from the dismissal of certiorari in Laboratory Corporation of 
America Holdings v. Metabolite Laboratories, Inc. 93 
The relevant principle of law "[e]xclude[s] from ... patent 
protection ... laws of nature, natural phenomena, and abstract 
ideas." ... The justification for the principle does not lie in any 
claim that "laws of nature" are obvious, or that their discovery is 
easy, or that they are not useful. To the contrary, research into 
such matters may be costly and time consuming; monetary 
incentives may matter; and the fruits of those incentives and that 
research may prove of great benefit to the human race. Rather, the 
reason for the exclusion is that sometimes too much patent 
90 See generally Jeremy D. Raux, Note, The Supreme Court and § 101 
Jurisprudence: Reconciling Subject·Matter Patentability Standards and the 
Abstract Idea Exception, 2014 U. ILL. L. REV. 629, 633-41 (2014) (providing 
historical background regarding the evolution of § 101 subject matter eligibility 
as defined by the Federal Circuit and Supreme Court). 
91 In re Allapat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 n.19 (Fed. Cir. 1994). 
92 Oppenheimer, supra note 86 at 3. 
93 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc. 548 U.S. 124, 125-39 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting). 
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protection can impede rather than "promote the Progress of 
Science and useful Arts," the constitutional objective of patent and 
copyright protection. 94 
The problem arises from the fact that patents do not only 
encourage research by providing monetary incentives for invention. 
Sometimes their presence can discourage research by impeding the 
free exchange of information .... 95 
Thus, the Court has recognized that "[p]henomena of nature, 
though just discovered, mental processes, and abstract intellectual 
concepts are ... the basic tools of scientific and technological 
work." It has treated fundamental scientific principles as "part of 
the storehouse of knowledge" and manifestations of laws of nature 
as "free to all men and reserved exclusively to none." And its doing 
so reflects a basic judgment that protection in such cases, despite 
its potentially positive incentive effects, would too often severely 
interfere with, or discourage, development and the further spread 
of useful knowledge itself. 96 
As noted by Federal Circuit Judge Newman in 1994, "[t]he 
boundary between patentable and unpatentable subject matter is 
not always a bright line."97 
Matters have not improved in the interim. The definition of 
statutory subject matter has puzzled the Federal Circuit,98 
commentators,99 and the PTO.loO The Supreme Court itself noted 
94 [d. at 126-27 (internal and other citation omitted). 
95 id. at 127. 
96 Id. at 127-28 (internal citation omitted). 
97 See in re Alappat, 33 F.3d 1526, 1543 n.19, 1569 ("The Supreme Court has 
not been clear ... as to whether such subject matter is excluded from the scope 
of' § 101 because it represents laws of nature, natural phenomena, or abstract 
ideas .... Diehr ... viewed mathematical algorithm as a law of' 
nature .... Benson . .. treated mathematical algorithm as an 'idea.' ... The 
Supreme Court also has not been clear as to exactly what kind of mathematical 
subject matter may not be patented. The Supreme Court has used, among 
others, the terms 'mathematical algorithm,' 'mathematical formula,' and 
'mathematical equation' to describe types of mathematical subject matter not 
entitled to patent protection standing alone. The Supreme Court has not set 
forth, however, any consistent or clear explanation of' what it intended by such 
terms or how these terms are related, if at all."). 
98 Metabolite Labs., 548 U.S. at 125-39. 
99 See Joshua Sarnoff, Patent·Eligible inventions after Bilski: History and 
Theory, 63 HASTINGS L.J. 53, 55 (2011) (arguing that it is difficult to draw a 
legal line regarding what is considered eligible subject matter under section 101 
in the United States); Aaron J. Zakem, Note, Rethinking Patentable Subject 
Matter: Are Statutory Categories Useful?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2983, 2988 (2009) 
("[Ilt has proven difficult to draw an exclusionary line which disallows 
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that the "line between a patentable 'process' and an unpatentable 
'principle' is not always clear."lOl The PTO and Federal Circuit, in 
trying to implement the Supreme Court's evolving definition of 
statutory subject matter, have announced, then abandoned (or 
had overruled), a series of patentable subject matter rubrics: the 
"technological arts" test;102 the "Freeman-WaIter-Abele" test;103 
the "mental steps" test;104 the "mathematical algorithm" test;105 
inhibitive patents without prejudicing claims on novel and non-obvious 
technology."), 
100 See infra notes 102-07 and accompanying text (describing the challenge 
of identifying a consistent test), 
101 Parker v. Flook. 437 U.S. 584.589 (1978). 
102 See Tn re Musgrave, 431 F,2d 882, 893 (C,C.P.A. 1970) (announcing the 
test), But see Gottschalk v, Benson, 409 U,S, 63, 71-72 (1972) (rejecting the 
same). 
103 Developed in three patent office decisions, the test essentially consisted of 
first determining whether a mathematical algorithm was recited directly or 
indirectly in the claim and, if so, next determining whether the claimed 
invention as a whole is no more than the algorithm itself or is applied to or 
limited by physical elements or process steps, In re Abele, 684 F.2d 902, 907 
(C,C.PA 1982); In re Walter, 618 F,2d 758, 767 (C,C.P.A. 1980); In re Freeman, 
573 F,2d 1237, 1245 (C,C,P.A. 1978); see AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comme'ns, Tnc., 
172 F.3d 1352, 1358 (Fed. Cir. 1999) (modifying the Freeman-WaIter·Abele Test 
to no longer require physical elements). 
104 See Musgrave, 431 F.2d at 893, 894 (''We cannot agree ... that tbese 
claims ... are directed to non· statutory processes merely because some or all 
the steps therein can also be carried out in or with the aid of the human mind 
or because it may be necessary for one periormjng the processes to think."). 
lOG Benson, 409 U.S. at 71 (1972) (finding that a claim to a method of 
converting binary-coded decimal numbers into decimal numbers was not an 
invention or discovery under § 101, even though the claimed method was to be 
performed by a computer, since the method had no substantial practical 
application other than with a digital computer); Flook, 437 U,S. at 585, 591,593 
(holding that a claim to a method of updating "alarm limits" was not covered by 
35 U.S.C. § 101 since it amounted to the discovery of a mathematical formula 
which, although novel, does not constitute a discovery that the statute would 
protect), Cf Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175, 178--79 (1981) (finding that a 
claim to a process for operating a rubber·molding press was within § 101, even 
though one element of the claim was the calculation of the appropriate time to 
open the press), The Court distinguished Flook as not containing "any 
disclosure relating to the chemical processes at work, the monitoring of process 
variables, or the means of setting off an alarm or adjusting an alarm system" 
and noted "excluded from such patent protection are laws of nature, natural 
phenomena, and abstract ideas .. " Our recent holdings in Gottschalk v, 
Benson. , . and Parker v. Flook, ... both of which are computer-related, stand 
for no more than these long-established principles," Id. at 185, 187. 
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the machine implemented test; lOG and the "transformation" 
test. 107 
The two industries most affected by the narrowing of the 
statutory language are computer software and medical 
technologylO8 - two of the most important industries in the U.S. 
economy. 109 The early cases of Gottschalk v. Benson,l1o Parker v. 
Flook,lll and Diamond v. Diehr1l2 seemingly settled the question 
for the computer industry, but Bilski v. Warsaw 1l3 and Alice 
Corp. Ply. v. CLB Bank Int'1114 have reopened it. Most recently, 
the Supreme Court has held that certain types of medical 
treatment inventions, although within the meaning of "process" 
are nevertheless excluded from the definition of "statutory 
subject matter" and therefore cannot be patented because they 
represent no more than observing a correlation between a 
biological datum and a preferred method of treatment,ll!i and 
that other types of inventions, although within the meaning of 
"composition of matter" are nevertheless excluded from the 
definition of "statutory subject matter" and therefore cannot be 
patented because they represent no more than extracting 
106 See In re Grams, 888 F.2d 835, 841 (Fed. Cir. 1989) (noting that the fact 
that a nonstatutory method is carried out on a programmed computer does not 
make the process claim statutory). 
107 Bilski v. Kappos, 561 U.S. 593, 604 (2010). 
lOS Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank lnt'!, 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2360 (2014); 
Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs., 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1299 (2012). 
109 See PHILIP F. POSTLEWAITE ET. AL., FED. INC. TAX. INTELL. PROP. & 
INTANGIBLE Ass. '1 7.01 (2015), available at 1998 WL 1038691 (describing the 
importance of the computer software market to the global economy); see also 
William W. George, Medical Technology and Competitivene8s in the World 
Market: Reinventing the Environment for Innovation, 50 FOOD & DRUG L,J. 477, 
477 (1995) (discussing the importance of' medical technology in the global 
industry). 
110 409 U.S. 63 (1972). 
111 437 U.S. 584 (1978). 
112 450 U.S. 175 (1981). 
113 Sec Bilski v, Kappas, 561 U.S. 593, 607, 609 (2010) (holding that the 
concept of hedging risk and its application to energy markets were not methods 
that were patentable as processes, but rather were unpatentable abstract 
ideas). 
114 See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int'I , 134 S. Ct. 2347, 2359 (201 4) 
(holding that the claims were not patentable because they simply instructed the 
practitioner to implement an abstract idea on a generic computer). 
115 Mayo Collaborative Servs. v. Prometheus Labs, 132 S. Ct. 1289, 1302 
(2012). 
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something which previously existed in nature.1l6 
These cases, at a minimum, complicate the decision of whether 
to seek patent protection for computer implementations or 
medical discoveries in general. Complication and uncertainty 
have two important consequences: they tend to favor trade 
secrecy in two fields where trade secret protection is a viable 
option,117 and they increase the cost of financing innovation in 
two fields where innovation is economically important.118 For 
example, while Congress would certainly have the power to 
exclude medicine from the type of progress the nation wants to 
encourage,119 it would be astonishing if it chose to do so, given the 
recent emphasis on the importance of improving access to 
medical care and cost containment and the hope that better data 
management will help reach those goals. 
V. THE CASE FOR STAGED PROSECUTION 
A. Precedents 
Even under the current compact prosecution system, there are 
116 Ass'n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, 133 S. Ct. 2107, 2117 
(2012). 
117 Computer programs can be maintained in secret while offering "Software 
as a Service." See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Taxing Facebook 
Code: Debugging the Tax Code and Software, 60 Bmy L. REV. 1, 51 (2012) 
(discussing cloud computing and SaaS). Diagnostic test companies can maintain 
processes and evaluation criteria in secret and insist that samples be sent to 
them for analysis. 
118 See George, supra note 109, at 477-78 (discussing the importance of 
innovation to manufacturers in the world market). 
119 Congress has done so in several areas. Nuclear weapons technology, tax 
strategy patents and claims "directed to or encompassing a human organism" 
are specifically excluded from patentability. See 42 U.s.C. § 2181(a) (2012) ("No 
patent shall hereafter be granted for any invention or discovery which is useful 
solely in the utilization of special nuclear material or atomic energy in an 
atomic weapon."); see also Leahy-Smith America Invents Act, Pub. L. No. 112-
29, §§ 14(a), 33(a), 125 Stat. 284, 327, 340 (2011) (codified as amended in 
scattered sections of' 35 U.S.C.) ("For purposes of evaluating an 
invention ... any strategy for reducing, avoiding, or deferring tax liability, 
whether known or unknown at the time of the invention or application for 
patent, shall be deemed insufficient to differentiate a claimed invention from 
the prior art .... [Additionally,] no patent may issue on a claim directed to or 
encompassing a human organism."). Although theoretically patentable, medical 
procedures are, in effect, not worth patenting as Congress has denied remedies 
for infringement. 35 U.S.C. § 287(c). 
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some aspects of a patent application that are examined 
separately and ahead of full substantive examination of the 
merits of the application,120 
Initially, even before according an application a filing date, it is 
examined for compliance with certain requirements of the 
statute. 121 These determinations-whether the application 
appears to be complete, 122 whether it includes any required 
drawings,12B whether it contains claims if a non-provisional 
application,124 whether it identifies the inventor,125 and whether 
the appropriate fees have been paid126~do not require knowledge 
of the technology or the prior art, and are carried out by a cross-
technology branch of the PTO .127 Of particular relevance to the 
120 See supra note 2 and accompanying text. 
121 There are two preliminary determinations made with respect to every 
application. First, it is determined if the application is entitled to a filing date. 
See 37 C.F.R. §§ L53(a), (b) (2014) ("Any papers received in the Patent and 
Trademark Office which purport to be an application for a patent will be 
assigned an application number for identification purposes .... The filing date 
of an application for patent filed under this section ... is the date on which a 
specification ... is received in the {Patent and Trademark] Office."). In 
compliance with the provisions of the Hague Agreement Concerning 
International Registration of Industrial Designs, the Patent Law Treaties 
Implementation Act of 2012 the only requirement for establishing the filing 
date for a Nonprovisional application is the filing of "a specification, with or 
without claims." Id. § L53(b). If the application meets these requirements, it 
receives a filing date and serial number even though there may be additional 
elements required before the application is ready for examination on the merits. 
ld. § 1.53(a); see also id. § 1.54(a) (allowing an application to be sent in parts). 
An application may even receive a filing date if it only refers to and 
incorporates by reference another pending application. See id. § 1.53(a) (stating 
that all papers "received in the Patent and Trademark Office which purport to 
be an application for a patent will be assigned an application number for 
identification purpose."). If an application does not include the required fees, at 
least one claim or the inventor's oath or declaration, the applicant is notified 
and given a period of time within which to supply the missing elements (and 
pay a surcharge). Id. § 1.53(£)(1). Only upon failure to respond within the 
allowed time results is the application abandoned.ld. 






127 See 35 V.S.C. § 131 (2012) (mandating that the director cause patent 
examiners to examine the patent application and the alleged new invention); see 
also JOHN GLADSTONE MILLS III ET. AL., 4 PAT. L. fuNDAMENTALS § 15:12 (2d ed. 
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argument for separating out other aspects of prosecution, these 
examinations are carried out quickly, typically within a month of 
filing the application. 
The current compact prosecution system also acknowledges 
special circumstances where certain aspects of examination 
should take place before others are addressed. 128 The MPEP lists 
several examples of such circumstances: 
(A) Where an application is too informal for a complete action on 
the merits;129 
(B) Where there is an undue multiplicity of claims; 130 
(C) Where there is a misjoinder of inventions; 131 and 
(D) Where disclosure is directed to perpetual motion. 132 
These determinations do not relate to the specific technology 
involved in the application, and do not require the time-
consuming process of determining the state of the art and 
making determinations of novelty or obviousness. Conceptually, 
they require legal rather than technological analysis. 
A determination of qualification as statutory subject matter is 
closely analogous to these types of determinations. It is an 
essentially legal analysis, not related to the technology 
involved.133 It does not involve a search or evaluation of the prior 
art or comparison of the claimed invention to the prior art.134 It 
therefore does not need not be evaluated in the Art Units, but 
rather could be centralized and dealt with as a preliminary 
matter. It should therefore be both feasible and within the PTO's 
authority to manage the prosecution process.!35 
2015) (discussing the patent application review process in more detail). 
121l See MPEP § 707.07(g) ("Some situations exist where examination of an 
application appears best accomplished by limiting action on the claim thereof to 
a particular issue."). 
12!-J [d. (citing MPEP § 702.01). 
130 [d. (citing MPEP § 2173.05(n». 
131 [d. (citing MPEP §§ 803, 810, 812.01). 
182 [d. (explaining that in this situation, examiners are instructed that "the 
best prior art readily available should be cited and its pertinency pointed out 
without specifically applying it to the claims"). 
133 See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. 
1:H See supra notes 129-32 and accompanying text. 
l35 It may well be that this preliminary determination will save costs by 
terminating some applications at this stage. While the net cost or benefit to the 
PTQ will not be known until the review has been implemented, this additional 
review will certainly take time and therefore require additional personnel and 
impose additional short-term cost on the PTO. In the model proposed below, two 
aspects are introduced to take account of this uncertainty; giving the applicant 
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B. Economic Justification 
The most pressing need for staged prosecution relates to early 
determinations of statutory subject matter qualification, and the 
industries most in need of this relief are those involved in the 
ongoing evolution of the Supreme Court's definition: biotech and 
computer software. 13G Although written in the early days of the 
biotech industry, Monsanto IP Counsel Byron Olsen's insights 
remain valid today: 
In many cases the availability of patent protection for corporations 
engaging in biotechnology R&D is essential to their 
survival ... [bJecause it generally takes so much investment to 
develop and get approval for a new therapeutic .... Besides the 
argument for enhanced industry security, allowing patent 
protection would stimulate this and related business sectors by 
creating jobs and contributing to a positive balance of trade that 
the United States generally enjoys within the intellectual property 
marketplace. 137 
The cost of development of new therapeutics has risen 
dramatically since those words were written in 19971~8 as has the 
importance of the U.S. biotech industry. 
Even while arguing that patent protection should not be 
extended to the discovery of a basic biological relationship, 
Justice Breyer noted: 
The justification for the principle does not lie in any claim that 
the option whether to request preliminary review of patentable subject matter 
eligibilit.y, and giving the PTO the option to establish a unique process for 
handling the request and to charge a fee. 
136 Byron V. Olsen, The Biotechnology Balancing Act: Patents for Gene 
Fragments, and Licensing the "Useful Arts", 7 ALB. L.J. SCl. & TECH. 295, 314~ 
15 (1997); see alsu Aaron J. z:.ackem, Note, Rethinking Patentable Subject 
Matter: Are Statutory Categories Useful?, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 2983, 2994~95 
(2009) (discussing the misapplication of the definition for algorithm as it applies 
to computer software categorizing the area as "unpatenable"). 
137 Olsen, .~upra note 136, at 321-22. 
138 The Tufts Center for the Study of Drug Development Annual estimate 
places the cost of developing a drug at $2.558 binion. Robert Weisman, Cost of 
Bringing Drug to Market Tops $2.5b, Research Finds, Bos. GLOBE (Nov. 18, 
2014), http://www.bostonglobe.comlbusiness/2014111118!cost·bringing. 
prescrip Lion ·drug -market· tops-billion· tufts· research ·cen ter-estimates!6mPph8 
maRxzcvftWjr7HUN!story.html. Forbes puts the cost at $5 billion. Matthew 
Herper, The Cost of Creating a New Drug Now $5 Billion, Pushing Big Pharma 
to Change. FORBES (Aug. 11, 2013), http://www.forbes.comlsites/matthewherper/ 
2013/08Jl1Ihow.the-staggering-cost-of-inventing-new-drugs-is-shaping-the· 
future-of- medicine!. 
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'laws of nature' are obvious, or that their discovery is easy, or that 
they are not useful. To the contrary, research into such matters 
may be costly and time consuming; ... and that research may 
prove of great benefit to the human race. 139 
Therefore, to the extent consistent with the Constitution and 
the statute, the patent system should attempt to preserve the 
incentive to continue to pursue and disclose these discoveries. 
An early decision directed solely to determining qualification 
as patentable subject matter has the potential to help reduce 
overall pendency and cut the cost of examination. Presumably, 
some of the determinations will be negative and, if the applicant 
respects that determination, the application will be abandoned. 
The most difficult and time-consuming aspect of examination is 
typically collection and analysis of the prior art.140 Therefore, 
applications removed from the queue for lack of patentable 
subject matter will be removed more quickly than if the 
application had undergone full examination (while applications 
which pass the patentable subject matter bar would impose no 
additional burden on the system if, as suggested below, that 
determination is viewed as binding on subsequent examination). 
A rough, unscientific measure of the complexity of prior art 
evaluations versus evaluation of statutory subject matter 
supports this proposition: the number of pages of the MPEP 
devoted to these two tasks. 141 Prior art issues require more than 
110 pages,L42 while section 101 issues are covered in four. 143 
139 Lab. Corp. of Am. Holdings v. Metabolite Labs., Inc., 548 U.S. 124, 126 
(2006) (Breyer, J., dissenting) (internal citation omitted). 
140 See Bhaven N. Sampat, W'hen do Applicants Search for Prior Art?, 53 J.L. 
& ECON. 399, 399-400 (2010) (noting that since patent examiners face severe 
resource constraints when conducting prior art searches, it is important for 
applicants to conduct their own prior art searches and then supply information 
to ensure the quality of issued patents). 
141 The MPEP contains the instructions to the PTO examining corps for 
handling all aspects of patent applications. The entire manual is more than 
2,800 pages long. The comparative numbers of pages cover the basic 
examination only - there are more complicated rules governing reexaminations, 
ex parte proceedings, and appeals. However, the proposal for staged 
examination would only apply to initial examination, so the comparison covers 
the appropriate sections of the MPEP. 
142 In the current version of the MPEP, the portion devoted entirely to prior 
art and searching takes fifty-five pages. See MPEP ch. 900 (9th ed. Mar. 2014). 
The portion of the MPEP devoted to prior art rejections covers sixty-two pages. 
See id. § 706.02. 
143 See id. § 706.03(a) (covering section 101 rejection in four pages). 
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Offering an early decision on patentable subject matter could 
also give the PTO an advantage over other national offices in the 
competition for international applications under the Patent 
Cooperation Treaty.144 Designating the U.S. as the examining 
authority would allow an applicant to receive an early 
determination as to availability of patent protection in the 
world's most important market,145 at a stage when the applicant 
still has trade secret protection,L46 This should make the U.s. a 
more attractive choice for preliminary examination than another 
country's patent office that would not provide this critical 
information until after publication of the international 
application and consequent loss of trade secret protection. 147 
This advantage would be of special importance to two key 
industries: computer software (including computer-implemented 
business applications and smartphone apps) and biotechnology.148 
These are industries with an enormous impact on the U.S. 
144 See id. § 1893 (providing the general guidelines for international 
applications and noting that the United States does not have any kind of 
expediting process). 
145 See 37 C.F.R. § 1.414(a) (2014) (stating that the PTO will act as the 
Designated Office for international applications seeking U.S. patent protection). 
146 See Susan Perng Pan & Sughrue Mion, Hybrid Use of Trade Secret and 
Patent Protection in Green Technology, in 3(4) BLOOMBERG LAW REPORTS-
SUSTAINABLE ENERGY, at 2 (2010) (explaining that trade secret protection can 
still he maintained during the first eight.een months of a patent application's 
pendency when first filed in the U.S.). 
147 Under the Patent Cooperation Treaty, applications are published 
eighteen months after the earliest filing date. See Patent Cooperation Treaty 
art. 21(2)(a), June 19, 1970, 28 U.S.T. 7645, 1160 U.N.T.S. 231, available at 
http://www . wipo. intfexport/si tes/www Ipct/erutextsipd£ipct. pdf. 
148 It is worth noting that the avalanche of hiotech applications in precisely 
the area now under doubt as a result of recent supreme court decisions, was 
precipitated by the federal government itself when its National Institute of 
Health, to the shock and criticism of many in the fledgling hiotech industry, 
filed the first patent applications [or human genes. See, e.g., NIH Gene Patent 
Application is Debated at Forum on Human Genome, 44 PAT., THADEMARK & 
COPYRICHT J. (BNA) 73, 75 (1992); Leslie Roberts, NIH Gene Patents, Round 
Two, 255 SCT. 912, 912-13 (1992); Hilary Stout, U.S. Pursuit of Gene Patents 
Riles Industry, WALL ST. J., Feb. 13, 1992, at B1; see also Liz Bowie, NIH is 
Hopeful on Gene Patents Despite Rejection Approval is Sought for 2,400 
Fragments, BAl.'!'. SUN, Sept. 24, 1992, http://articles.baltimoresun.com/1992-09-
24Ibusinessf1992268051_1_apply -for-patents-o btain·a -pa tent· gene (noting that 
the NIH's application for patents on gene fragments "has caused a contentious 
debate between the government and academic researchers who are trying to 
draw a map of the 50,000 to 100,000 genes in the human body"). 
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economy.149 These are also industries that typically file patent 
applications routed to Art Units with above-average pendency 
times,150 precisely because they are important industries with 
active research and development programs. 151 They are also 
industries directly affected by the Supreme Court's most recent 
pronouncements on statutory subject matter.152 
C. Legal Justification 
Qualification of a claim as statutory subject matter is a legal 
issue - whether claims constitute statutory subject matter is a 
question of law and is reviewed without deference. 153 This 
determination is, therefore, logically separable from substantive 
examination, much as the special circumstances exceptions of 
MPEP § 707.07(g) or the preliminary completeness review of 35 
U.S.C. § 503. 154 
Examiners are trained in the technology, and not required to 
be lawyers. The determination of statutory subject matter 
qualification does not depend on the prior art,155 so no search or 
comparison between the prior art and the claimed invention is 
necessary. Logically, the examination for statutory subject 
matter could be made by a unit staffed by lawyers or paralegals. 
Moreover, a number of court cases (apparently ignoring the 
PTO's internal guidance regarding compact prosecution) view 
statutory subject matter as a "gatekeeper" requirement and 
appear to assume that this evaluation takes place prior to 
substantive determinations of prior art and enablement 
requirements. 156 The courts also appear to believe (again, 
149 Bowie, supra note 148. 
150 USPTO REPORT FY 2013, supra note 53, at 190. Thus, even if the PTO 
reaches its goal of reducing average pendency below eighteen months, it is 
unlikely that the average in these art units will reach that level. 
151 Estimates vary widely, but put the cost to bring a new drug to market in 
the billions. See supra note 138 and accompanying text. 
152 See supra note 136 and text accompanying. 
153 AT&T Corp. v. Excel Comm'ns, Inc., 172 F.3d 1352, 1355 (Fed. Cir. 1999). 
154 See discussion supra Part V.A 
155 MPEP § 706.02(III) (9th ed. Mar. 2014). 
156 See In re Comiskey, 499 F.3d 1365, 1371 (Fed. Cir. 2007) (stating that the 
first step to accomplish is statutory subject matter determination); State St. 
Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature Fin. Grp., Inc., 149 F.3d 1368, 1372 n.2 (Fed. 
Cir. 1998) (providing that one of the categories of statutory subject matter is 
required to pass through to the second door of the process); In re Bergy, 596 
F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.PA 1979) ("The first door which must be opened on the 
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notwithstanding the PTO's internal guidance) that an examiner 
who concludes that a claimed invention is not statutory subject 
matter will end the inquiry at that point, and will not proceed to 
evaluate the sufficiency of enablement or patentability over the 
prior art.157 
Finally, from the perspective of the constitutional bargain, 
section 101 is qualitatively different from the other statutory 
sections1fi8 that may be the basis for rejecting claims to a 
patent.159 The section 112 requirements of enablement and 
claiming specificity are both within the applicant's controP60 If, 
in fact, the applicant has possession of the invention, then the 
applicant can satisfy these requirements and examination will 
not change thaL161 Section 112 therefore poses no risk to 
patentability and hence is not a factor in weighing the risks of 
publication. Similarly, the section 102 and 103 requirements that 
a patent be issued only for new, non-obvious technology, should 
not be a factor in weighing the risks of publication. These 
sections only come into play if there is already publicly available 
information describing the claimed invention1o:': or rendering it 
obvious. 163 If such information is already publicly available (even 
if not known to the applicant), then by definition there is no 
trade secret to protect. 164 
difficult path to patentability is § 101."). 
lfi7 See State St. Bank, 149 F.3d at 1372 (noting that section 101 is a 
threshold issue that must be addressed before other questions of patentability). 
158 See Bergy, 596 F.2d at 960 (explaining how section 101 is "distinguished 
from the qualitative conditions which make the invention patentable"). 
159 Id. 
160 See 35 U.S.C. § ] 12 (2012) (requiring an inventor to provide a detailed 
specification "in such full, dear, concise, and exact terms as to enable any 
person skilled in the art to which it pertains ... to make and use the same"). 
161 If, however, the applicant cannot describe the invention or teach those of 
ordinary skill how to make and use the invention, then the applicant has 
nothing to protect and loses nothing by disclosure. 
162 Id. § 102. 
16;{ Id. § 103. 
164 A trade secret is defined as "information ... that: (i) derives independent 
economic value, actual or potential, from not being generally known to, and not 
being readily ascertainable by proper means by, other persons who can obtain 
economic value from its disclosure or use, and (ii) is the subject of efforts that 
are reasonable under the circumstances to maintain its secrecy." Unif. Trade 
Secrets Act § 1(4) (amended 1985). Thus, for at least three reasons there can be 
no trade secret. Definitionally, a trade secret must be information that the 
applicant's competitors do not know. ld. If publicly available, competitors can 
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A section 101 rejection is different - it does not deny patent 
protection because the public already has the technology or 
because the applicant refuses to disclose it fully.165 Rather it 
denies protection solely because the technology is not within a 
protectable category. 166 This difference matters, because it means 
that the applicant could maintain the technology as a trade 
secret rather than seek a patent. Thus, it is the only category of 
substantive rejection that would logically come into play in an 
applicant's decision whether to maintain trade secret protection 
or forfeit it in hopes of obtaining a patent. 
1. Unworkable Solutions 
Two options under the existing system might suggest 
themselves as solutions: opting out of pre-grant publication167 
and requesting expedited processing of the application.l68 
Current rules allow an applicant to affirmatively opt out of the 
pre-grant publication program. lil!) In order to do so, the applicant 
must represent that the application will not be filed in any 
country that publishes applications before the grant of a patent, 
including under the Patent Cooperation Treaty.170 While this 
solution technically avoids the dilemma presented by the need to 
decide whether to surrender a trade secret in the absence of 
critical information, it exacts a significant price. In effect, it 
merely transfers the dilemma from "surrender trade secret or 
not" to "surrender international protection or not." 
Current rules also allow an applicant to request expedited 
examination under certain conditions, and upon payment of an 
gain access through proper means, negating trade secret status. Id. Finally, if 
publicly available, there is no way the applicant can take reasonable steps to 
protect it. ld. 
165 See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 960 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (explaining that 
sections 102 and 103 "guardD the public interest by assuring that patents are 
not granted which would take from the public that which it already enjoys 
(matters already within its knowledge whether in actual use or not) or 
Potentially enjoys by reason of obviousness from knowledge which it already 
has"). 
166 See id. (noting three protected categories under section 101; novelty, 
utility, and statutory subject matter). 
167 37 C.F.R. § 1.213(a) (2014). 
168 Id. § 1.102(a). 
169 Id. § 1.213(a). 
170 Id. § 1.213(a)(3). 
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extra fee. l7l The scope of expedited examination does not differ 
from the scope of regular examination - the application is simply 
placed in a separate queue, ahead of those in the regular 
examination queue (but behind other expedited applications).172 
There is therefore no guarantee that the examination will take 
place early enough to beat the eighteen-month publication 
date. 173 Use of the expedited system also does nothing to deal 
with the fundamental problem of pendency - the average 
pendency will remain the same, it is just that different 
applications will be examined first.174 On the other hand, staged 
application offers the possibility of reducing average pendency 
because of the possibility that applications will be disposed of at 
the preliminary stage, using fewer office resources (because of 
the elimination of the need to conduct prior art searches and 
evaluations). 
2. A Workable System 
While the motivation for compact prosecution was laudable, 
subsequent events have turned its advantages into 
disadvantages in many important situations. At a minimum, 
applicants should have the option to request that certain issues 
be examined before a full review on the merits. The issue of 
statutory subject matter is the issue that currently logically fits 
and demands attention, but other issues may be appropriate in 
the future and consideration should be given to an applicant's 
option to request preliminary determination of any non-
technological issue of patentability. 
Because the issue is purely legal, it would make sense for the 
PTO to establish a unit, staffed by legally trained personnel, to 
make the determinations. Setting up such a unit, rather than 
having the decisions made within the various art units, would 
also have the advantage of developing a more coherent body of 
precedent and should lead to more predictable results. This 
would further the main objective of the system by giving 
inventors early information regarding patentability prospects so 
as to encourage disclosure in those areas Congress has chosen to 
incentivize, and would also give the patent bar a tool for 
171 Jd. § l.102(a), (e). 
172Id. 
173 35 U.S.C. § 122(h)(1) (Supp. 2013). 
174 37 C.F.R. § l.102(a). 
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providing reliable advice. 
The decision on qualification as statutory subject matter must 
be made quickly - no later than 16.5 months after filing,175 but 
ideally much earlier. The decision must be binding on the PTO 
during examination. Amended claims, of course, could not receive 
this preliminary evaluation because they were not part of the 
original filing and therefore the PTO would not have made a 
determination regarding those claims. It would be desirable that 
amended claims receive statutory subject matter evaluation that 
is consistent with the evaluation of originally filed claims, but the 
applicant controls the drafting of claims so it would not be unfair 
to limit the binding effect to originally filed claims only. 
The decision should be reviewable, either by interlocutory 
appeal to the Board of Patent Appeals or by petition to the 
Director. Not only would the availability of an immediate appeal 
be of value to the applicant, but it would also provide the PTO 
with a vehicle for monitoring the issue and developing a coherent 
and consistent policy in the face of uncertain and evolving 
guidance from the courts. 
While early determination seems to benefit both the applicant 
and the PTO, the applicant might be charged a fee for requesting 
a preliminary determination of a non-technological issue. To 
protect against unforeseen misuse of the system, a petition could 
be required, with the presumption that such petitions would 
ordinarily be granted absent special circumstances.176 
Such a system would, of course, require personnel, but if it in 
fact results in the early abandonment of applications prior to 
substantive examination, it should in the long run reduce the 
need for additional personnel or reduce the burden on existing 
personneL It should fit neatly within the agency's existing 
structure and would likely be revenue neutral or positive. In the 
event that the system did impose additional costs, they could be 
recovered by user fees. If properly set, the fees should be 
acceptable to the inventor community as a reasonable cost of 
critical information, along with the option of avoiding additional 
175 See supra note 66 and accompanying text (discussing the calculation of 
this timeframe). 
176 A similar system is already in place for reviving unintentionally 
abandoned applications. 37 C.F.R § 1.137 (2014). Technically, a petition to 
revive (and filing fee) must be filed, and the Director has the authority to deny 
the petition or require additional information, but if the petition is filed 
promptly the presumption is that it will be granted. ld. 
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prosecution costs in the event of an adverse decision. 
Such a system would separate out a comparatively easy issue, 
one that does not require a time·consuming search of prior art or 
any technological comparison with the prior art. It would have 
the potential of saving the PTO resources by weeding out some 
applications at a preliminary stage, before there is a need (as 
required under compact prosecution) to develop a response on 
complex technological issues that would be moot in light of the 
essentially legal issue of statutory subject matter. The PTO could 
also use the opportunity to build a specialized group with 
expertise in resolving this recurrent issue quickly and efficiently. 
Applicants would likewise save money if convinced of the lack of 
statutory subject matter at an early stage. Of greatest 
importance, an early response on this issue gives the applicant 
valuable information in time to make an informed choice between 
trade secret protection and patent protection. 
The Supreme Court has noted that the patent laws are not 
"primarily designed to provide a special private benefit" to 
inventors.177 The Court has also acknowledged, though, that the 
patent laws are "intended to motivate the creative activity of 
authors and inventors ... and to allow the public access to the 
products of their genius after the limited period of exclusive 
control has expired."178 Assuring inventors that their innovations 
will not be taken from them unfairly is a big step toward 
motivating creativity and, more importantly, disclosure, which is 
the ultimate goal of the Patent Statute. 
177 Sony Corp. of Am. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 
(1984). 
178 Jd. 
